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A STORY FOR ALL SEASONS: AKHIL REED AMAR ON
THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Michael Kent Curtis*
INTRODUCTION
The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction,' by Professor Akhil Reed
Amar looks at our first national Bill of Rights (drafted in 1789) and at our second,
the Fourteenth Amendment (drafted in 1866). It shows how we moved as a nation
from a vision of states, by and large, setting legally enforceable citizens' rights to the
vision of a truly national Bill of Rights. Though others, including myself, have
studied how we achieved a national Bill of Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
and the role that the battle over slavery played in defining American rights, no one
has told the story of the Bill of Rights with more beauty and elegance than Akhil Reed
Amar. Application of the Bill of Rights to the states, long championed by Justice
Hugo Black of Alabama, has received strong, though qualified, support from a
distinguished Professor at Yale Law School.
Basically, the application of the Bill of Rights to the states is the story of how a
popular understanding ofthe Bill of Rights eventually expanded its reach beyond the
narrow scope of Supreme Court decisions to make it a national guarantee that limited
the states as well. This popular understanding helped to produce Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 Court decisions, in turn, nullified the plan to make states
obey basic guarantees of the Bill of Rights,3 a process largely reversed later by a
series of decisions culminating in those of the Warren Court.4 As Amar sees it, the
* Michael Kent Curtis teaches Constitutional Law, Free Speech, American Legal and
Constitutional History, and Agency at Wake Forest University School of Law. Professor
Curtis graduated from the University of the South, in Sewanee, Tennessee, and from the
University of North Carolina School of Law.
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); see also MICHAEL
KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL
OF RIGHTS (1986) [hereinafter, CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE].
' See, e.g., Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require jury trials in state courts); Hurtado v. California, I 10 U.S. 516
(1884) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did protect grand jury indictment in state
courts); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (holding that the rights of citizenship
under the federal government were limited to things such as protection on the high seas and
apparently did not include the Bill of Rights).
' See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (making the Bill of Rights
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Supreme Court generally reached the correct result, but it did not employ the best
rationale.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court transformed Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment into a robust protector of corporate interests. 5
Today, a similarjudicial and legal transformation seems to be underway on a number
of legal fronts, including new interpretations of the Bill of Rights.6 These
developments are beyond the scope of Amar's book, but his basic story is relevant to
how we might think about them.
There are many good reasons to read Amar's splendid book. It is a great story
and it is our story, the story of American liberty. History gives us context and
meaning. At its best, history provides a vicarious experience, which is necessary for
wisdom. By increasing the number of cases and factors we consider, history can help
us to reach wiser results. As Justice Black understood so well, bills of rights were
invented by people who had experienced and learned from harsh abuses of power and
denials of human rights.7 Having learned these lessons, and often having learned
them very painfully, these people have important things to teach the rest ofus. Thus,
it is worthwhile to revisit their experience.
History is also important for legal analysis. If the law is the resultant force of the
vectors of text, history, structure, precedent, and public policy, then history is one
factor judges, lawyers, and public officials should consider in reaching decisions.
The problem, of course, is that people do not agree on the weight to be given to these
factors. Decisions in human affairs, unlike problems in mathematics, cannot be
reduced to a formula.
protection against double jeopardy applicable to states); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (making the right to a criminal jury trial from the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states).
' See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a law setting
maximum hours for bakers on the theory that the general right to make a contract in
relation to a business is part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Gulf,
Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause protected a railroad from paying an attorney's fee to a prevailing plaintiff
with small claims); Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886)
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause applies to corporate persons).
6 See, eg., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm., 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding
that the Fifth Amendment applied to an owner of beachfront property whose property was
allegedly taken pursuant to a South Carolina environmental regulation); First Nat'l. Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (holding that the First Amendment privileges
extend to corporations spending on ballot measures); cf Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240
(1999) (holding that sovereign immunity protects states from suits by their employees under
the federal Fair Labor Standards Act).
' See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (discussing
the history of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation).
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Yet, if history is one of the keys to legal meaning, how should we examine it?
Ours is a nation founded on popular sovereignty, so a crucial original meaning of a
constitutional provision is what "we the people" understood the provision to mean.
With so many people involved, reconstruction of original meaning is an
approximation at best. The task of scholarship is to give a more complete account.
Fine scholars, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once suggested, may add a barnacle or
two to the coral reef of knowledge.' Akhil Amar's book has added new barnacles to
the reef. As Holmes' metaphor suggests, we necessarily build on the work of our
predecessors. In answering the question of whether the Bill of Rights applies to the
states, we all owe a substantial debt to the work of Justice Hugo Black, to the late
Professor W. W. Crosskey, and to their critics.'
Among Amar's many contributions, five stand out. The first is his use of the
forms of constitutional arguments identified by Phillip Bobbitt to help us understand
the problem of the application of the Bill of Rights to the states.'0 The fit is natural,
obvious, and elegant. Many of the particular arguments from text, history, precedent,
and the like already existed in the literature. " Amar's great contribution is to apply
them and some new ones to the historical data in a systematic, elegant, and organized
way, enriching as well as reorganizing the substantial evidence already accumulated
on these topics. By separately applying the lenses of text, precedent, and history,
Amar helps us to see the application of the Bill of Rights to the states more clearly.
Sincejudges and lawyers regularly use arguments from text, constitutional structure,
history, and precedent, Amar's study offers valuable skills for lawyers and aspiring
lawyers. There is no better way to deepen one's understanding ofthese methods than
reading Akhil Amar's book.
In his textual and historical analysis, Amar has marshaled and expanded the
substantial evidence and interpretation showing that the words "no state shall...
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" was widely
understood to apply Bill of Rights liberties to state action.'" Amar recognizes and
S See SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES 130 (1989).
" See Adamson v. Califomia, 332 U.S. 46,71-72(1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing
that one of the principal purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment was to make the Bill of
Rights applicable to the states); William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative
History," and the Constitutional Limitations of State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4
(1954) (same).
0 See PHILLIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1982); see also CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969) (discussing the use of structural considerations when
interpreting the Constitution).
" See, e.g., Crosskey, supra note 9.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The evidence on this point continues to grow. See, e.g.,
Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The Privileges
or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000);
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deals with a paradox here. In 1833, thirty-five years prior to the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Barron v. Baltimore3 held that the Bill of Rights was merely
a limit on the federal government, not the states.14 Amar does a finejob of explaining
how some judges and other "Barron Contrarians" could see the Bill of Rights as a
limit on the states, even before the Fourteenth Amendment. 5
Prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Americans increasingly
had begun to understand and appeal to the national Bill of Rights as a charter
recognizing the basic rights of all American citizens throughout the land.' 6 That fact
also helps explain the relation of the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States"'" to the Bill of Rights.
A second contribution of Amar's The Bill of Rights is that it gives us a wider
focus. It sees the Constitution not simply as the document written in 1787 and the
Framers not simply as James Madison and James Wilson. Instead, it sees the full
Constitution with all its amendments and later history and views it with an expanded
pantheon of creators and heroes. These include not only the men of 1787, but also
John Bingham and Jacob Howard, framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
many men and women, black and white, who transformed public opinion and made
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments possible.
A third and related major contribution is Amar's sensitive portrayal of the role
of women and Americans of African descent in the struggles that eventually led to the
framing of the Fourteenth Amendment. Amar has done much to recognize their
substantial contributions and to highlight the work of other scholars who have noted
their role.'
A fourth contribution is that Amar emphasizes the declaratory understanding of
the Bill of Rights. By this view, the Bill declared basic rights of Americans. The
declaratory understanding of the Bill of Rights, in turn, helps to explain how the
Fourteenth Amendment could absorb and apply Bill of Rights guarantees.
A fifth contribution is Amar's vision of the original Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment's second bill of rights as the products of two different worlds.
Amar sees the original Bill as about federalism and majority rule. I am somewhat
skeptical. Still, a major contribution ofthe book is to emphasize and partly to explain
the transition from a state-centered judicial system of citizens' rights to a jointly
national and state system. Amar suggests that the original Bill of Rights was
Michael Kent Curtis, Two Textual Adventures: Thoughts on Reading Jeffrey Rosen's
Paper, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1269, 1273-80 (1998) (including some historic examples
of the use of the words "privileges" and "immunities").
13 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
14 See id. at 249.
"s See AMAR, supra note 1, at 140-62.
16 See id. at 4; CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 2, at ch. 2.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18 See AMAR, supra note 1, at 239-41.
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substantially about localism and states' rights. 9 While the First Amendment disabled
Congress from abridging the freedom of speech, press, petition, and religion, it left
the regulation of these matters to the states. As a matter of judicial doctrine and
judicially enforceable rights, that proposition was self-evident.
As to popular understanding, however, the picture was less clear. Citizens, even
in the early years of 1798-1800, often thought of the Bill of Rights as far more than
ajurisdictional statement.2° It declared the fundamental rights of all Americans and,
at least morally, implied that the government should not infringe upon these rights.
Evidence in Amar's book further supports the idea that the declaratory tradition, so
important to the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, is old and strong." This
view became more powerful over time.22 Amar's basic point about a shift to a more
national understanding is undoubtedly correct. His point about the declaratory nature
of Bill of Rights liberties helps to show why the idea of the rights, as merely limiting
federal power, was never fully accepted.
The Establishment Clause, as Amar notes, helps to make this abstract
jurisdictional point more concrete. In 1791, a number of states had establishments
of religion.23 The Establishment Clause, as originally understood, prohibited
Congress from making any law respecting an establishment of religion and so left the
matter of establishment or disestablishment to the states. The rest of the First
Amendment also could be read in a similar way, and that is how the Supreme Court
read the First Amendment in antebellum years.25
In contrast to thejurisdictional reading, the individual rights reading would treat
rights of press, speech, jury trial, and religion as recognized by both the state and
federal constitutions, and secured, to a limited extent by each, against violation. Even
in the early years, Americans often thought of themselves as enjoying these Bill of
Rights liberties, privileges, or immunities as Americans, notjust Virginians or New
Yorkers.26 Many Americans thought these rights were protected against any act of
'9 See id. at 5-7.
20 See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
2 See AMAR, supra note 1, at 147-56.
22 See id.
23 See id. at 32-33.
24 See id. at 41-42. By the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, the picture had changed.
States no longer had establishments of religion and many saw the protection against
establishment more as a national right. See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the
Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085
(1995); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious
Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106 (1994).
25 See Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1894); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243
(1833).
26 See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text; see also Michael Kent Curtis, The
Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Anti-Slavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835-
37, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 785, 830, 859-63 (1995) [hereinafter Curtis, Curious History]
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government; 27 the rights were of the people reserved for the people. Many citizens
thought their rights were more extensive than legal orthodoxy suggested.2" When they
cited constitutional provisions, they often cited the First Amendment, as well as the
state constitution, as recognizing their rights, denying federal power over them, and
protecting the rights from the states.29 Each colony had a common British heritage,
which gradually transformed after independence into a common American heritage.
That fact helped people think of basic rights as belonging firstto the English and later
to Americans.
I will give a few examples of this view. In protesting the Sedition Act, a meeting
of citizens of Fayette and adjoining Kentucky counties resolved that "the privilege of
speaking and publishing our sentiments on all public questions" was "unequivocally
acknowledged and secured to us by the constitution of this state as well as that of the
United States," making all laws to impairthese rights void.30 Even Thomas Jefferson
sometimes seemed to have assumed that Americans as a people had national freedoms
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights that were quite distinct from their rights under state
law. In 1814, Thomas Jefferson wrote about a state court blasphemy prosecution for
the sale of a book. "I am really mortified to be told that, in the United States of
America, a fact like this can become a subject of inquiry, and of criminal inquiry too,
as an offense against religion."' The prosecuting state was not Jefferson's Virginia.
Jefferson did not contend that the prosecution was barred by the First Amendment,
but he asked, "Is this then our freedom of religion?" 2 As his italicized "United States
of America" and his reference to "our freedom of religion" indicate, Jefferson
believed that there was a freedom of religion for Americans quite distinct from the
question of whether state courts or state laws respected it. The privilege was distinct
from the remedy for its violation.33
(discussing the Bill of Rights privileges and liberty protections in the abolitionist movement
context).
27 See Curtis, Curious History, supra note 26, at 859-63.
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 Albany, SPIRIT OF THE TIMES: INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE, Dec. 6-10, 1798 at 1. For
a states' rights argument, see Dr. Hill's Speech, in SPIRIT OF THE TIMES: INDEPENDENT
CHRONICLE, Feb. 21, 1799, at 2; Kentucky, SPIRIT OF THE TIMES: INDEPENDENT
CHRONICLE, Oct. 1-4, 1798, at 1; see also Kentucky, SPIRIT OF THE TIMES: INDEPENDENT
CHRONICLE, Oct. 18-22, 1798, at 1; Knoxville, SPIRIT OF THE TIMES: INDEPENDENT
CHRONICLE, Nov. 15-19, 1798, at 1; Virginia, SPIRIT OF THE TIMES: INDEPENDENT
CHRONICLE, Oct. 8-12, 1798, at 1.
" Letter from Thomas Jefferson to N.G. Dufief (Apr. 19, 1814), in THOMAS JEFFERSON,
WRITINGS 1333, 1334 (Merril D. Peterson ed., 1984).
32 Id. at 1334.
33 On at least several occasions, Jefferson had a less protective view of libel of public
officials and thought that while no federal remedy existed for such defamation, a remedy
was available at state law. See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS, 341
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As the nation expanded westward, Amar explains that more and more Americans
began to think of themselves first as Americans, and second as state citizens because,
for more and more people in the new states, their first government was a federal
territorial one.' Amar does a particularly fine job of showing why this would be so
for people like John A. Bingham, the primary author of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.35
A major factor in increasing the emphasis on national rights was state repression
of civil liberties, which became more intense as the controversy over slavery
intensified. By the eve of the Civil War, southern states like North Carolina were
banning Republican newspapers and campaign literature, censoring the mails to keep
out items franked by Republican congressmen, and criminally prosecuting those who
circulated Hinton Helper's anti-slavery book.36 Circulators of anti-slavery literature
faced threats of prison and whipping for the first offense and death for the second."'
North Carolina sought to extradite Republicans who had endorsed an abridgement of
Helper's anti-slavery book.3" The endorsers included members of the committee that
drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, including John Bingham, its primary author.
Republicans facing such attacks, seeing the hash slavery was making of civil liberty,
began to insist more and more that the Bill of Rights provided national protection for
all American citizens throughout the nation. Congressman John Bingham and
Senator Jacob Howard told their colleagues that the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to require the states to obey the Bill of Rights.40 They and their Republican
colleagues naturally remembered the thirty years of repression of Bill of Rights
liberties in the South.4'
Seeds of this substantial shift in thinking about individual rights and government
power lay in the long-held idea that Americans possessed certain rights recognized
by the federal Bill of Rights, though technically not enforceable against their states.
(1985).
3 See AMAR, supra note 1, at 157-59.
3S See id. at 158.
36 See Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis over Hinton Helper's Book The Impending
Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1993) [hereinafter Curtis,
Helper Crisis].
37 See id. at 1147-67. The 1860 legislature decided that the death penalty should be
imposed for the first offense. See id, at 1144.
38 See id
39 See id. at 1151-58, 1174.
40 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 432, 2542 (statement of Rep. Bingham); id.
at 2765-66 (statement of Rep. Howard); Curtis, Helper Crisis, supra note 36, at 1169
nn.328, 331.
41 See Curtis, Helper Crisis, supra note 36, at 1137-59; see also AMAR, supra note 1,
at 160-62, 192-93.
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The Republican demand in 1866-1868 that the rights should be enforceable against
the states involved both change and continuity.
SOME RESER VA TIONS:
So far, I have justly praised this splendid book. I also have some reservations.
I. FROM A MAJORITARIAN BILL OF RIGHTS TO ONE
PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS
In one of his powerful insights, Amar emphasizes that the Framers of the original
Bill saw "the people" as the principal and government officials as their "agents." '42
Guarantees of liberty, he says, were designed to ensure that the agents did not abuse
their power to the prejudice of the people, their principal.43 In this sense, according
to Amar, the original Bill was popular, republican, and majoritarian. Rights of "the
people" were collective rights. The later Fourteenth Amendment was more of a
liberal Bill protecting minorities."
Guarantees of liberty have both these aspects, though at different times and for
different purposes one aspect or another may be emphasized. Madison, as Amar
notes, emphasized both, particularly the function of the original Bill of Rights in
protecting the minority.4" The guarantees of freedom of press and speech and the
criminal procedure protections against self-incrimination and unreasonable searches,
for example, are personal rights, but they also check efforts by government officials
to destroy their political opponents. That protection, in turn, is essential for
meaningful protection of popular sovereignty. The two aspects of the rights are two
sides of the same coin. Rights of free speech, press, and religion simultaneously
protect individuals and serve to check those in power. Indeed, without the protection
for individuals, the check on potentially oppressive government officials cannot work.
Without protection for minority views, the majority is deprived of meaningful
choice-it is forced into a cafeteria with only one dish.
Amar seeks to squeeze every ounce of meaning out of the words of the text, and
the result is often quite impressive. Still, all methods can run to excess. Here, Amar
overemphasizes the collective nature of the Bill of Rights. While Amar sees textual
reference to the rights of"the People" as denoting a more collective right,46 this seems
to be thin support. Of course, he relies on other evidence as well.
42 See AMAR, supra note i, at 21-23, 84-85, 224.
41 See id.
44See id at 84-85, 244.
41 See id. at 22.
4 See id. at 49.
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A. Jury trial
One of the most illuminating aspects of The BillofRights is its description of the
relation ofjuries to popular sovereignty.4' Juries were seen as the part ofthejudicial
branch of government that puts popular sovereignty into action. Amar quotes de
Tocqueville to illuminate the populist and majoritarian aspect of the jury system:
The institution of the jury... places the real direction of society in the
hands of the governed,. . . and not in that of the government .... [It]
invests the people, or that class of citizens with the direction of
society .... The jury system as it is understood in America appears to
me to be as direct and as extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the
people as universal suffrage. They are instruments of equal power, which
contribute to the supremacy of the majority.4"
In his emphasis on the majoritarian nature ofjuries, Amar highlights one aspect
of reality, but obscures another, as analysis inevitably does. Juries had both a
majoritarian and individual-rights minority protection aspect, especially before the
Supreme Court began to transform the institution by allowing both juries of fewer
than twelve people and non-unanimous verdicts. Because the jury was required to
have twelve members, to be drawn randomly from ordinary citizens, and to arrive at
an unanimous decision, it could and often would function to protect minority rights.49
If the Zenger jury is an example of protecting either a popular or a majority view,50
the English jury that acquitted the Quaker, William Penn, shows that juries also
functioned to protect minorities." While an all whitejury in the South after the Civil
War was a serious problem, after the Fifteenth Amendment and Reconstruction,
juries became integrated bodies that could provide better protection for Americans of
African descent. Klan prosecutions presented a problem for the jury system, but a
41 See id at 83-89. This aspect would also have pleased Justice Hugo Black.
41 Id. at 88 (quoting Alexis de Toqueville).
"9 State Constitutions typically have left the historic features of the jury intact, but if they
do not, federal protection is slim. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979); Colegrove
v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
so See The Trial ofJohn Peter Zenger for Seditious Libel, in LAW AN. D JURISPRUDENCE
IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 31-51 (Stephen S. Presser & Jamil Zainaldin eds., 3d ed.
1995).
"' See The People's Ancient and Just Liberties Asserted, in the Trial of William Penn
and William Mead, 1670 in THE BILL OF RIGHTS, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 144-58
(1971).
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number of these trials resulted in convictions.5 2 Remarkably, the Klansmen were
eventually protected from federal conviction, not by juries, but by the Supreme
Court. 3 As with any other institution, the jury should be judged not on its absolute
perfection, but in comparison to alternatives.
B. Refined Incorporation
Amar has created the idea of refined incorporation. Some Bill of Rights
guarantees, Amar suggests, may not sensibly incorporate.54 For example, if the First
Amendment was merely ajurisdictional device, then it would contain no basic rights
applicable to the states. The same would be true for civil juries. Amar's great
contribution is to focus on both the problem and part of the solution-the popular and
declaratory understanding of the rights. Unfortunately, he fails systematically to
apply his insight.
One must look at the matter as the people would in 1866-1868 when the
Fourteenth Amendment was under consideration, not in 1789-1791 when the original
Bill of Rights was debated. As to the application of these liberties, the historic
understanding that should count is that of 1866-1868.
The better result, however, is much like that arrived at by Justice Black." That
proposition is so for two reasons. The guarantees of the first eight amendments, the
ones John Bingham and Justice Black highlighted as being applied against the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment, were understood by 1866-1868 as doing far more than
allocating jurisdiction; they were understood as declaring basic rights.56 Amar
demonstrates this aptly for Free Speech and Press guarantees. As the resolution from
Kentucky concerning the Sedition Act indicates, that understanding reaches far
back. 7 By the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, most evidence suggests that the
first eight amendments were understood to declare rights, not simply to allocate
jurisdiction to invade them."8 A great contribution of Amar's refined incorporation
52 See ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1867, at 76-196
(1985).
" See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1972) (holding that the rights of
citizenship under the federal government differ from those under the various state
governments); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (reversing convictions of
men accused of using violence to hinder the Constitutional rights of assembly and bearing
arms of two African-Americans).
54 See AMAR, supra note 1, at 269-7 1.
5 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
56 See CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 2, at chs. 2, 3, & 5; Curtis,
Helper Crisis, supra note 36, at 1146-64.
17 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
58 Some aspects of federal law, however, such as the federal jury district, should not be
imposed on the states. Amar's analysis shows why. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 269-71.
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analysis is to demonstrate how the understanding of the Bill of Rights changed over
time. Its shortcoming is not applying the insight consistently. The case of the civil
jury demonstrates the limits of the concept of refined incorporation. 9
Amar also suggests that, historically, the rights to be protected by the Privileges
or Immunities Clause would include basic common law rights, either as absolutely
protected or as merely protected, against discrimination.' The legislative history on
the subject is murky. Some read the Clause as expansively protecting common law
rights.6 ' Others, like Congressman Bingham, seem to have rejected this reading.62
At least some seem to have located a protection against discrimination in the Equal
Protection Clause and expected judicial intervention in cases of discrimination based
on race or national origin.63 If there had actually been an original broad
understanding of the Amendment as protecting absolute common law rights or as
protecting common law rights generally against discrimination, that could raise the
specter of reviving decisions like Lochner."' That the framers planned to follow such
a road is quite dubious and whether we should do so today is more doubtful still.65
C. The Unsung Civil Jury
Amar sings the praises of the criminal jury.66 It provides education in
citizenship.67 The provision for public criminal trials in the Sixth Amendment
ensures that citizens can watch government at work.68
However, civil juries receive little praise. Amar suggests that perhaps the
Seventh Amendment guarantee was simply not intended to be applied to the states.
69
The original understanding ofthe Seventh Amendment civil jury, according to Amar,
was that it ensured that the federal courts would provide a jury in diversity cases
where state law required it."0 Amar sees the Seventh Amendment as reflecting the
s See AMAR, supra note 1, at 269-278.
60 See id. at 182.
6! See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 844 (1872) (statement of Rep. Sherman).
62 See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Bingham).
63 See Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunites Clause and
Revising the Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1, 82-85 (1995).
6 See id at 96-106.
65 See id. at 36-50, 56-64, 85-86, 96-106.
' See AMAR, supra note 1, at 83-88.
67 See id.
68 See id
69 See id at 225-26.
70 See id.
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Tenth Amendment.7 His refined incorporation conclusion is that the Seventh
Amendment "becomes somewhat awkward to incorporate against states," for
incorporation would mean that "state courts must follow current state-law rules
providing forjury trials in state courts," which they would do without incorporation. 72
In his model of refined incorporation, Amar suggests the Seventh Amendment might
simply not be capable of incorporation. 73 He is right to be tentative.
One can make exactly the same point about the First Amendment rights to free
speech, free press, and free exercise of religion. Originally, as the Supreme Court in
Barron understood the matter, the Bill of Rights simply left regulation of First
Amendment freedoms to the states, making application to them equally "awkward. 74
However, quite early, and certainly by 1864-1868, politicians, editors, ministers, and
other ordinary people understood the Bill of Rights as most contemporary Americans
do-as providing rights to all Americans.75 It was "a layman's document, not a
lawyer's contract," to quote President Franklin D. Roosevelt's comment on the
Constitution.76 People in 1866, laymen and lawyers alike, seemed not to have
engaged in recondite, refined analysis, however sensible it might have been from the
perspective of legal theory. In popular understanding, it is the declaration ofthe right
that survives and limits government. Amar himself has brilliantly illuminated the
declaratory nature of the Bill of Rights.7 7 A great many Americans from 1830-1868
saw rights in the Bill of Rights including free speech, free press, freedom of religion,
and freedom to ajury trial as "rights," "privileges," or "immunities" belonging to all
citizens of the United States, shielding them from state or federal government abuse
on every inch of American soil.78 For many, the civil jury trial was simply another
basic right.
Amar's evidence to support the exclusion of the Seventh Amendment is
remarkably thin. He notes that, in 1850, a Georgiajudge "quoted or paraphrased, in
order, every clause of the first eight amendments, [including the establishment
clause], except the Seventh, and insisted that all of the quoted or paraphrased clauses
71 See id. at 89.
72 Id. at 92.
71 See id at 276.
71 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833); see also Permoli v. New Orleans, 44
U.S. 589 (1845).
" See AMAR, supra note 1, at 156-60.
76 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 377 (1998) (quoting
Franklin D. Roosevelt's speech, given on the 150th Anniversary of the Philadelphia
Convention).
77 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 1, at 20-136 (discussing various amendments in the Bill
of Rights).
78 See CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 2; Michael Kent Curtis, The
1837 Killing of Elyah Lovejoy by an Anti-Abolition Mob: Free Speech, Mobs, Republican
Government, and the Privileges of American Citizens, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1109, 1147-50
(1997) [hereinafter Curtis, Lovejoy].
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bound the states."79 Also, when Republicans "repealed the (uryless) Fugitive Slave
Act of 1850, a Republican proclaimed the repeal would provide trial by jury 'in
accordance with the Constitution of the United States and the laws of the state where
such person is found."'8 Neither source explicitly embraced the idea that the
guarantee meant one would receive a civil jury trial if and only if the state chose to
supply one, or that states could make juries of only one person.
When John Bingham cited two cases in 1866 to show the need to apply the Bill
of Rights to the states, the second case he cited involved an alleged denial of the
Seventh Amendment right to civil jury trials."' In 1871, Bingham, who wrote all of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment except for the citizenship clause, explained
that "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as
contradistinguished from citizens.of the States, are chiefly defined in the first eight
amendments to the Constitution of the United States."82 Bingham then read, word for
word, each of the first eight amendments, including the Seventh. Then he said,
"[t]hese eight articles I have shown never were limitations upon the power of the
States until made so by the fourteenth amendment."83 Bingham said that before the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state "could deny to any citizen the right
of trial by jury, and it was done. Before that a State could abridge the freedom of the
press, and it was done in half the States of the Union."84 In a speech in 1871,
Representative Lawrence of Ohio insisted that the Seventh Amendment's guarantee
of a civil jury trial was protected against federal action by the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause (as well as the Seventh Amendment), and against the states by
the Due Process and Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Lawrence insisted that "where the power of eminent domain is to be exercised under
State authority ...a trial at law by a common law jury is now a matter of
constitutional right. ... [S]ince the adoption of the fourteenth article it may well be
maintained that a common law jury trial is, secured."85
Why is Amar queasy about the Seventh Amendment? There may be several
reasons. The requirement of a jury trial in all cases where only twenty dollars or
more is in controversy seems to many extraordinarily bad policy.86 To make the pill
of incorporation go down more smoothly, Amar may have been tempted to remove
7 AMAR, supra note 1, at 276 (citing Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353, 364 (1852)).
80 Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2919 (1864) (remarks of Rep.
Daniel Morris) (alterations in original)).
81 See Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. 469 (1833).
82 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham)
(emphasis added).
83 Id. (emphasis added).
84 Id.
' CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1245 (1871) (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
86 See Charles Fairman, A Reply to Professor Crosskey, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 144, 155
(1954).
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the bitter civil jury trial. However, if that is the problem, it would be better to
construe twenty dollars as the present value of twenty dollars in 1866 or 1791 rather
than simply and totally disregard the guarantee. Furthermore, one might hold that the
right could be satisfied by trial de novo with a jury.
There is a related problem. The values of 1866-1868 may simply be in conflict
with dominant contemporary values. In such cases, legal scholars and historians can
simply note the conflict.
The basic problem that leads people to look for an escape from the civil jury is
that the civil jury has suffered a decline in reputation. 7 The decline occurred
precisely because the civil jury expresses democratic values in opposition to
plutocratic values. The civil jury system, like the tort law system, is under a
sustained attack from concentrated wealth and power. This result is not surprising
given the number of high-profile tort suits that threaten corporate power. The public
learned of the havoc produced for women by the Dalkon Shield, as well as what the
company knew and when it knew it, as a result of tort suits.8 The public learned
much of the effect of asbestos on workers, as well as what companies knew but did
not reveal to workers or to government, as a result of tort suits. 9 The public learned
about Ford Motor Company's negligent design of the Pinto and its conclusion that it
was more cost-effective to incinerate a certain number of drivers than to make
changes as a result of a tort suit." Finally, the public learned much more about toxic
substances and cancer as a result of the lawsuit chronicled inA CivilAction.9' More
recent examples will no doubt come to the reader's mind. In civil actions, juries,
reflecting democratic values, have compensated victims of negligence and punished
what they saw as corporate misconduct.92 In a culture in which corporations are
thought to be responsible only to stockholders and the bottom line, tort law and civil
juries include community values in the calculation of the bottom line.
To the extent that juries are impdrtant decision makers, the jury system is
extraordinarily difficult for special interests to capture. Jurors have short term limits,
One ground Anit-Federalists urged for rejecting the Constitution was its failure to
safeguard the civil jury. See, e.g., 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 47 (photo reprint 1996) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
189 1) (statement of Patrick Henry).
88 See MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE
DALKON SHIELD (1985).
89 See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON
TRIAL (1985).
90 See FRANCIS T. CULLEN ET AL., CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATTACK (1987). But see
Cary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUT. L. REV. 1013 (1991)
(suggesting misconceptions in the public's understanding of the Ford report on cost
effectiveness).
9' See JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995).
92 See BRODEUR, supra note 89; MINTZ, supra note 88.
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cannot receive campaign contributions, and are widely representative of the public at
large. As a result, the jury system itself is under a well-financed attack. False and
misleading stories are added to a few genuine cases of excessive jury verdicts to
discredit the system. Thejury mistakes on the other side, such as inadequate awards,
or no awards at all in strong cases, get little attention, nor do judicial decisions
reducing excessive verdicts.
II. A MODERN MORAL?
On June 16, 1858, Abraham Lincoln warned his listeners that they might go to
sleep dreaming that Kansas would become a free state and awake to find Illinois a
slave state.93 With a pro-slavery activist Supreme Court and a national Democratic
Party increasingly in the grip of the slave power, Lincoln's fear was not so fanciful
as it seems today. Today, we face new concerns. The story of the Bill of Rights pays
little attention to problems of "private" economic power and "private" violence. As
a result, Amar and I may spend so much time admiring the shell of American liberty
and learning how it became so lustrous, that we overlook the fact that the kernel is
deteriorating. However, the story of the creation and reconstruction of the Bill of
Rights is relevant to current threats to democratic government. Just how this is so
requires an explanation that starts with the battles for liberty and against slavery.
In the 1830s, abolitionists sought to put the issue of slavery on the political
agenda." They sought to confront the conscience of slaveholders and their northern
accomplices and to confront the national government's support for slavery. The
reaction was furious. Northern mobs broke up abolition meetings, threatened
individuals, and killed one abolitionist editor.95 In response, abolitionists invoked
guarantees of civil liberty, including those in the federal Constitution." The threats
to them were not merely from state laws, but also from private mobs. So a key
insight of many abolitionists, and those who came to their aid, was that private
power, like state power, can threaten basic liberties.
When people think of mobs, many think of the "lower classes." Yet, the leading
historian on the subject tells us that these mobs were organized by gentlemen of
property and standing.9" Why? William Ellery Channing, the Unitarian minister,
suggested that the Wealthy and powerful (those who had drawn high prizes in the
lottery of life) tended to identify with members of their social class, including
9' See ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1832-58, at 432 (Library of
America ed. 1989).
94 See Curtis, Curious History, supra note 26, at 802-846.
9' See id
96 See id. at 859-63.
9' See LEONARD L. RICHARDS, "GENTLEMEN OF PROPERTY AND STANDING": ANTI-
ABOLITION MOBS IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA 47-49, 55-59 (1970).
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slaveholders." Many businessmen and others feared that economic ties between the
South and North would be disrupted." One need only look today at the United
States' continuing trade relations with China, despite China's recurring human rights
abuses, to understand such a dilemma.
Northern opinion finally turned against mobbing anti-abolitionists.'° However,
in the South, laws and mobs prevented Republicans and opponents of slavery from
speaking.' While part of the fear in the South was that abolitionist literature would
spark slave revolts, that was not the only or perhaps even the main concern of the
southern slaveholding elite. Around seventy-five percent of southern households did
not own slaves, and many southern whites were independent, non-slave holding small
farmers and some were quite poor.! Opponents of slavery sought to organize non-
slaveholding southerners into an anti-slavery party that would abolish slavery on a
state-by-state basis. 3 Those who raised these gut economic issues about slavery
were feared as instigators of "class warfare" (to use the current phrase mobilized
against those who raise issues of economic justice).'.
With Reconstruction, newly freed male slaves became voters and, for a time, a
bi-racial coalition ruled the South.' As Eric Foner has shown, black suffrage made
a difference. On economic issues such as landlord-tenant law, southern legislatures
with black voters were more protective of the interest of tenants and laborers. 6 They
were more likely to support "radical" ideas such as public education. As lawyer,
author, Republican activist, and judge Albion Tourgee saw it, "[F]or the first time [in
a southern state] the rights of the masses were regarded above the interest of any
aristocracy, and manhood regarded as of more value than money."' 10 7
Southern Republicans and their allies faced a continuing campaign of terror
designed to intimidate Republicans and eliminate the newly freed slaves from the
political process. In North Carolina, for example, a prominent leader who sought to
build a coalition between newly freed slaves and poor whites was assassinated along
98 See William Ellery Channing, Tribute of William Ellery Channing to the American
Abolitionists, for their Vindication of Freedom of Speech, in ANTI-SLAVERY TRACTS NOS.
2, 3, & 11 (1970 reprint) (1861).
9 See Curtis, Lovejoy, supra note 78, at 1132-42.
,00 See id. at 1160-71.
"'t See Curtis, Helper Crisis, supra note 36, at 1137-38, 1153-54, 1164-67.
102 See KENNETH STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTIBELLUM
SOUTH 29-30 (1956).
103 See Curtis, Helper Crisis, supra note 36, at 1150.
See Curtis, Curious History, supra note 26, at 845.
los See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1988).
'o6 See id. at 372-73.
107 OTrO H. OLSEN, CARPETBAGGER'S CRUSADE: THE LIFE OF ALBION WINEGAR
TOURGEE 197 (1965) (quoting Albion Tourgee).
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.with a black political leader.' Violence, and later southern laws, nullified the
Fifteenth Amendment. Here again, leadership for the Klan came from the wealthy
and powerful. At least, that is what Albion Tourgee, the Republican "carpet-bagger"
judge who later represented Plessy in his attack on railroad segregation, said. 0 9
When prosecutions threatened to expose the Klan, North Carolina's "Conservative"
dominated legislature acted quickly by repealing laws under which many prosecutions
had been filed."0  Conservatives-as the faction described itself-were
understandably reluctant to repeal laws against murder. The solution was an amnesty
law that extended, as Tourgee sardonically noted, both to the Klan and its victims."'
In this respect, the story of the Bill of Rights may skip too quickly over some
extremely bleak aspects of the American experience that continued until very
recently." 12 For a huge slice of American history, from at least 1830 to the 1960s,
much of the South was neither really democratic nor open to free speech on issues of
race."'3 Its racially skewed electorate also tended to keep other issues offthe political
agenda." 4 The closed society of the South involved class as well as racial
suppression.' The three-fifths clause, and later, fully counting disenfranchised
blacks for purposes of seats in the House of Representatives and votes in the electoral
college, gave the South a disproportionate influence compared to its number of
eligible voters." 6 Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to prevent
just this result, but it was a dead letter.
This suggests, quite disturbingly, that for much of our history, we have been far
less democratic and free even than our written Constitution suggested. Takejust one
example. In 1897, a populist, black Republican coalition, controlled the city
government in Wilmington, North Carolina." 7 It wasdisplaced, not by election, but
by a coup and race riot."" In two days of rioting,
los See id. at 161-65.
'09 See id. at 156-57.
10 See id. at 185-87.
.. See id.; Michael Kent Curtis, Albion Tourgee: Remembering Plessy's Lawyer on the
100th Anniversary of Plessy v. Ferguson, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 187, 191 (1996)
[hereinafter Curtis, Remembering Plessy 's Lawyer].
12 See generally AMAR, supra note 1; CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note
2.
113 See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS (1989);
PAUL ESCOrT, MANY EXCELLENT PEOPLE: POWER AND PRIVILEGE IN NORTH CAROLINA,
1850-1900 (1985).
"4 See ESCOTT, supra note 113.
11 See id
116 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, ci. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIlI.
11 See H. Leon Prather, Sr., We Have Taken A City: A Centennial Essay in DEMOCRACY
BETRAYED: THE WILMINGTON RACE RIOT OF 1898 AND ITS LEGACY 35 (David S. Cecelski
& Timothy B. Tyson eds., 1998).
"s See id. at 136-50.
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a mob of white citizens led by some of Wilmington's most respected and
influential residents... destroyed the state's only African-American daily
newspaper, killed at least nine blacks and drove hundreds from their
homes, forcefully expelled black and white political and business leaders
opposed to Conservative Democratic rule and white supremacy, and used
paramilitary forces to remove from office Wilmington's duly elected city
government. This violent episode initiated a successful statewide
campaign ... to disfranchise the state's African American citizens... 9
Violence and electoral fraud aimed at a white and black Populist coalition was
endemic in the South. The federal government did nothing.
One must wonder why were stories about the effort to secure free speech on the
subjects of slavery and the Reconstruction terrorism story not more widely and fairly
told earlier in American history. Perhaps the nation needed a story to explain the
demise -of Reconstruction, to explain why terrorists and later states were able to
nullify constitutional guarantees, and to explain why the land of liberty and justice for
all was doing nothing about it. In Slaughter-House and later cases, the Supreme
Court obligingly supplied a legal explanation. 2' From Prigg,'' to DredScott,2 1 to
Slaughter-House, to Lochner,' to cases denying application of the Bill of Rights to
the states,'24 and beyond, it is remarkable how miserable the record of the Court often
has been from the point of view of the poor and the oppressed. The much maligned
Warren Court was a notable exception. 2 ' Little had changed since 1833. States
were not bound by the Bill of Rights. Private violence was beyond the scope of
federal power. Historians in the North and South also helped. Many of them viewed
Reconstruction as a time when venal Carpetbaggers and ignorant blacks looted
southern state governments.'26 By helping to return John Bingham and the rest to
19 Melton McLaurin, Remembering for Reconciliation and Healing, N.C. HUMAN.,
Winter 1999, at 1, 1 (Newsletter of the N.C. Human. Council, Greensboro, N.C.).
120 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872); see also James v. Bowman, 190 U.S.
127 (1903); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542 (1875).
121 See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 608 (1842).
122 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
123 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
124 See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); cf Patterson v. Colorado, 205
U.S. 454 (1907); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). For an evaluation of Lochner
and recent call to revive it, see PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK, ECONOMIC
REGULATION ON TRIAL 177-86 (1998).
125 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., J. G. DE ROULHAC HAMILTON, RECONSTRUCTION INNORTH CAROLINA 667
(1971 reprint) (1914).
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their rightful place, Akhil Amar's The Bill of Rights is providing a more honest,
complete, and usable past.
The old-time Republicans saw how economic power supported slavery. Abraham
Lincoln referred to the tendency of prosperity to breed tyrants.'" While Calhoun
suggested an alliance between the capitalists of the North and of the South to silence
abolition and labor agitation, 2 a Lincoln later suggested that the rights of labor should
be superior to those of capital. 29 John Bingham said that slavery was banned from
the political agenda in the South because the southern slaveholding elite was
protecting its profits.1
30
As industrialism and railroads transformed post-Civil War America, the nation
developed concentrations of wealth and capital unprecedented for that time.
Corporate bribery of government officials scandalized many citizens.' 3' In a nation
that lacked strong national power over its economy, bans on child labor and
protections for labor were difficult to establish. If New York outlawed child labor,
its furniture manufacturers had to compete with North Carolina, which had no child
labor laws. Child labor, lack of protection for workers, and the rest, were justified
as the decisions of an all-wise market. 32 With the doctrine of economic substantive
due process and a limited reading of the power of Congress over commerce, courts
took too many basic economic issues out of the political process. 3 Coincidentally,
the 1890s and the 1920s were also times during which the concentration of wealth
greatly increased and mergers soared.3 The market, as it was constructed at that
time by a legal structure that allowed it to operate with fewer constraints, degraded
the democratic process.
Of course, by conventional wisdom, concerns about the concentration of wealth
are out of place in the discussion of constitutional law. The conventional view is that
constitutional law is by and large about public, not private, power. Rarely are there
legal thinkers who raise basic issues.1
3
127 See 8 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 405-06 (Roy P. Blaser ed.,
1953).
12 See Curtis, Curious History, supra note 26, at 826.
29 See, The Lincoln-Douglas Debates in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS,
(1859-1865), at 295-97 (Library of America ed. 1989).
30 See CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1861 (1860); Curtis, Helper Crisis, supra
note 36, at 1149.
131 See CHARLES F. ADAMS, JR., & HENRY ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE, AND OTHER
ESSAYS (Comell Reprint 1996) (1886); KENS, supra note 124, at 33-40.
132 See KENS, supra note 124, at 68-79. I
133 See, e.g., Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Hammer v. Dagenhardt,
247 U.S. 251 (1918); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
'34 See KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR (1990).
'.. See, e.g., James G. Wilson, Noam Chomsky and Judicial Review, 44 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 439 (1996).
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Yet, it was not always so. In the past, many thinkers, including ones who did not
embrace our modern democratic and egalitarian ideals, recognized a direct relation
between distribution ofeconomic power and the form of government. These instances
include Aristotle and de Tocqueville, to mention only two.1 36 A high concentration
of economic power, as many of these thinkers saw it, tends to produce an oligarchy.'1
3 7
A broad distribution of wealth produces a more representative government. For
example, de Tocqueville, who regarded land as a measure of wealth, thought laws of
inheritance were a crucial constitutional device. "It is true that these laws belong to
civil affairs;" de Tocqueville wrote, "but they ought, nevertheless, to be placed at the
head of all political institutions; for they exercise an incredible influence upon the




De Tocqueville understood the interrelation between economic power and
constitutional law. "When framed in particular manner, this law [of inheritance]
draws together, and vests property and power in a few hands; it causes an
aristocracy, so to speak, to spring out of the ground."' 13" Of course, many other laws
contribute to the concentration or dispersion of economic power, including, for
example, laws regarding taxation and antitrust. Even James Madison, who earlier
sought to control the dangers of economic leveling, later saw threats from the other
direction. By the 1790s, Madison favored "the silent operation of laws, which,
without violating the rights of property, reduce extreme wealth towards a state of
mediocrity, and raise extreme indigence towards a state of comfort."' 40
In the 1980s and 1990s, the silent operation of the laws seemed to be moving
matters in the other direction, producing massive corporate mergers and an
increasingly skewed distribution of income. By 1989, the top ten percent of the
population held sixty-nine percent of the wealth. 141 Critics charged that consumers
were gouged and corporate coffers were filled by all sorts of governmental decisions,
from decisions on generic drugs to telecommunications. 42
Consolidation of corporate media empires threatens to filter stories out of the
1316 See id. at 445-48 (Aristotle); see also JAMES HARRINGTON, THE ART OF LAW GIVING
IN DIVINE RIGHT AND DEMOCRACY: AN ANTHOLOGY OF POLITICAL WRITING IN STUART
ENGLAND 392-98 (David Wooten ed., 1986); infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
"3 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, reprinted in STEPHEN B.




"4 James Madison, NATIONAL GAZETTE quoted in STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 267 (1993).
'4' See EDWARD N. WOLFF, THE RICH GET INCREASINGLY RICHER: LATEST DATA ON
HOUSEHOLD WEALTH DURING THE 1980S 4 (Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper) (on
file with Author).
142 See, e.g., DEAN ALGER, MEGAMEDIA: HOW GIANT CORPORATIONS DOMINATE MASS
MEDIA, DISTORT COMPETITION, AND ENDANGER DEMOCRACY 97-113 (1998).
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mass media. Rupert Murdock dropped the BBC news from his satellite system
because it was too critical of China on human rights.143 Murdock wanted to market
soap operas and other entertainment to the Chinese. 44 For similar reasons his
publishing empire broke a contract to publish a book critical of China, but the author
found another publisher.'45
A major threat to democracy, of course, is the current system of campaign
finance. The Supreme Court had genuine reasons to be concerned with the federal
statute it struck down in Buckley, 46 but the Court has done its part to create what Bill
Moyers accurately describes as "The Other Scandal" in Washington. 47
Amar's The Bill of Rights, with its understanding of popular sovereignty as a
cornerstone of our constitutional government, can give us perspective on these
developments. One function of the First Amendment, as Amar notes, was to protect
the people from self-dealing by their elected agents. 48 Consider the implications of
the metaphor. If officials are agents and the people are the principle, one wonders
what we are to think of a system that allows a few to channel great wealth to the
people's agents from whom they seek lucrative favors. The result is to corrode public
trust in the democratic process. As far back as 1992, seventy-four percent of
respondents agreed that "Congress is largely owned by special interests."' 49 By 1996,
more than eighty percent of the public agreed that government is "run for the benefit
of the few and the special interests, not the people... ."' Meanwhile, more and
more disenchanted voters have dropped out of the political process.
Restrictions on campaign finance reform are a major aspect of our new Lochner-
era. One of the most extravagant claims has been made in a suit against a Maine
initiative that set up publically financed state elections. A suit filed by the American
Civil Liberties Union claimed, among other allegations, that a system of public
finance for election campaigns impermissibly chills free speech where the system
'41 See John Gittings, Murdoch's Beijing Love-fest, THE GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 12,
1998, at 14, available in LEXIS, News Library, The Guardian (London) File.
'4 See id
141 See id For other examples of dangers inherent in media empires controlling
information disposal, see, e.g., Tom Goldstein, Does Big Mean Bad, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 52, 52; Seth Faison, Dalai Lama Movie Imperils Disney's Future
in China, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1996, at AI; G. Bruce Knecht, Magazine Advertisers
Demand Prior Notice of 'Offensive'Articles, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1997, at 1.
146 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
147 See BILL MOYERS, THE SECRET GOVERNMENT: THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS (Other
Scandal in Washington (PBS Video) Series 1988); see also Donald Bartlett & James B.
Steele, How the Little Gets Crunched, TIME, Feb. 7, 2000, at 38-40.
48 See AMAR, supra note 1, at 21, 23, 26.
149 E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANTZ, BUCKLEY STOPS HERE: LOOSENING THE JUDICIAL
STRANGLEHOLD ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 16 (1998).
i' Noam Chomsky, "Consent Without Consent": Reflections on the Theory and
Practice of Democracy, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415, 417 (1996).
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provides limited extra matching funding for the publicly financed candidate outspent
by opponents who choose not to take public finance.' The theory seems to be that
wealth has not only a right to speak, but a right not to be answered by those with
lesser resources.
A reasonable interpretation of the First Amendment needs to preserve the right
of the people to criticize their agents and to discourage practices which make or
appear to make the agents responsive to concentrated wealth, not the average voter.,
The marketplace of ideas, like other markets, needs true competition. Free television
and radio time for political candidates, a revival of the Fairness Doctrine, and public
financing of elections are options to explore for those who want to preserve the kernel
as well as the shell of democracy. Problems of campaign finance are sufficiently
crucial and complex to justify attention from our best legal minds.
Some might read Amar's book as suggesting that the popular sovereignty aspects
of the Bill of Rights have been transmuted by the Fourteenth Amendment. This essay
suggests, instead, that the Bill of Rights continues to have a dual aspect. The need
for both the popular sovereignty and individual rights protections of the Constitution
and Bill of Rights is as great or greater than ever.
If one sees the hallmark of the Lochner-era as expansion of the power of
concentrated wealth and a corresponding shrinkage of the democratic process, we are
in the midst of a second Lochner-era. This era is characterized by court decisions
that make it difficult to control the purchase of political influence;5 2 by a set of rules
for the global economy set by groups like the World Trade Organization, which is
"'1 See ACLU Complaint, Daggett v. Bernier, available at American Civil Liberties
Union, (visited Jan. 28, 2000) <http://www.aclu.org/court/meefr.htmi>. Paragraph five of
the complaint reads as follows:
Non-participating candidates are also put in the unconstitutional position of
either curtailing their own speech or effectively subsidizing their "clean"
opponent's speech. Unlike the federal public financing system for presidential
elections, which establishes at the outset the maximum payment from the
election fund and imposes a fixed spending ceiling for publicly-financed
candidates, the MCEA provides "clean" candidates with an initial payment
from the Maine Clean Election Fund ("MCEF") in an amount equal to the
average amount spent in the two preceding elections, plus an additional
dollar-for-dollar subsidy to match the amount a non-participating opponent
raises or spends in excess of the initial distribution. Thus, once the matching
subsidy is triggered, the "clean" candidate is released from the spending limit
that was initially imposed, and the MCEF provides additional funds to thwart
any attempt by a non-participating opponent to deliver his or her message by
outspending a "clean" candidate. (The only limit on the amount of the
matching subsidy is that it cannot exceed 200 percent of the initial payment
from the MCEF).
Id.
152 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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insulated from the democratic process;' and by a politically-constructed global
market that makes the maintenance of national labor, health, and environmental
standards more problematic." The World Trade Organization strikes down national
environmental and health regulations it finds dubious, much as the Lochner-era
courts sometimes did. "' The invisible hand of a legally-constructed market more and
more is removing basic issues from the democratic process. For example, the French
face great difficulty in banning milk with Bovine Growth Hormone or meat with such
hormones because a few men in the World Trade Organization hold such a rule to be
anti-competitive." 6 That rule is so, amazingly enough, even if the French apply the
rule to their own dairy farmers as well.' Similarly, Americans cannot ban the sale
of seafood whose harvest has a decimating effect on the sea turtle population, because
that rule too is struck down as being anti-competitive."' Banning products made by
child labor, slave labor, exploited labor, or environmental degradation may meet the
same fate. Even if they do not, the global economy has made effective regulation
difficult. A global market without global labor, consumer, and environmental
standards may make "hash" of protections for workers, consumers, the environment,
and also of democracy-if one views democracy as the ability of"we the people" to
structure the aspects of our lives that mean the most to us."59
One answer is to replace broad democracy with the market, on the theory that the
market gives "us" what "we" buy, and therefore what "we" want. Yet, even requiring
labels that tell consumers basic facts they want to know may be in trouble, nationally
and internationally. At least one court has interpreted the First Amendment to mean
that Vermont cannot require merchandisers to label milk to indicate whether it was
produced with Bovine Growth Hormone, though the state showed this to be a fact that
seventy-five percent of its consumers wanted to know. 0 In a free market, keeping
desired information from consumers seems bizarre. A central legitimizing myth of
the free market is that consumers get to choose the products they want.
Ironically, many state efforts to reform the current campaign finance scandal may
's See Joan Claybrook, WTO, Where's the Outrage, PUBLIC CITIZEN NEWS, Nov./Dec.
1999, at 2; High Cost of Global Trade Documented in New Book, PUBLIC CITIZEN NEWS,
Nov./Dec. 1999, at 1 [hereinafter High Cost].
's See Claybrook, supra note 153, at 2; High Cost, supra note 153, at 1.
rs See id; see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 63-64 (1905).
156 See Mark Weisbrot, A Trade Body on Hormones, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 4, 1999, at
A23, (Op-ed), available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File.
157 See id.
158 See James Bruggers, San Francisco-Area Animal Groups Sue over Dolphin-Safe
Tuna Label, KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIB., Business News, Aug. 19, 1999, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Business Services File; Editorial, Turtles, Coyotes, Butterflies, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, June 17, 1999 at 10.
'9 For many, however, shrinking democracy may be a small price to pay for a prosperity
they attribute-rightly or wrongly-to this new world order.
"6o See International Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
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be hampered by the incorporation doctrine plus Lochner-like legal doctrines. The
problem of the next century may be the revival, in new clothes no doubt, of Lochner-
era jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
These concerns bring this essay back full circle, to extolling the virtues of this
remarkable book. At its deepest level, it is a tale of popular sovereignty at work.
Amar's story is one of ordinary Americans confronting a great evil and its
concentrated power and of how guarantees of civil liberty are essential if such an
effort is to have a fighting chance. Buying and selling human beings, of course, is
another market, but abolitionists and Republicans saw it as more than that. They
insisted on a market bounded by ethical rules. If some failed to appreciate problems
beyond slavery, they were fallible human beings, like the rest of us.
Albion Tourgee, Republican, carpetbagger, judge, and later lawyer for Plessy in
the landmark case ofPlessy v. Ferguson, noted the problem. In response to a Gilded
Age creed that equated wealth with virtue, he insisted, "The Power of wealth ... is
just as properly subject to restraint as that of the biceps and is even more liable to
abuse."' 6 ' In 1894, he wrote, "Almost every branch of our government has lost touch
and sympathy with the people."'62 He noted sadly, "The idea is almost universal that
money rules."'63 This proposition was so "no matter which party is in power, and the
general impression is that the enactment of law, its administration and enforcement,
are also controlled by the power of money."' 64
Akhil Reed Amar's story suggests that Justice Black was wise to treat the history
of Bill of Rights liberties as teaching that these parts of the text deserve special
solicitude. Once one understands the structural role of these liberties in preserving
democratic government, they do look quite important. Justice Black's study of the
Levellers made him aware of the problem of rogue agents. 6 As Akhil Amar notes,
that agency problem is also a central concern of the Bill of Rights and, I believe, the
Fourteenth Amendment as well. 66 Yet, recent history also suggests that legal
doctrines and theories can prove quite malleable.
It is easy to respond to the state of democracy in modern America with despair.
Those saddened by current developments may take some hope from the story of the
161 OLSEN, supra note 107, at 285-86.
162 Id. at 325.
163 Id.
"6 Curtis, Remembering Plessy's Lawyer, supra note 111, at 198.
161 See ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK 450-51 (1994); Michael Kent Curtis, In
Pursuit ofLiberty: The Levellers and the American Bill of Rights, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY
359 (1991); Edward G. Hudon & John Lilburm, The Levellers, and Mr. Justice Black, 60
A.B.A. J. 686 (1974).
'" See AMAR, supra note 1, at 21-23, 84-85, 224.
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relation of the crusade against slavery to the Bill of Rights. Critics of slavery and
advocates of the rights of blacks and women also faced immense obstacles and won
what they achieved only after a long and difficult struggle. Margaret Mead suggests
that we should never underestimate the ability of a few dedicated people to change the
world. Indeed, she says, nothing else ever has. 167
167 See MARGARET MEAD, COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF
PRIMITIVE YOUTH FOR WESTERN CIVILIZATION (1928).
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